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Reviews of Books

Rose’s phrase—buttressed the dominant white view)
but also “Yankees,” who were rendered in a similar collection of subhuman images. Thus did a culture under
siege define its own version of whiteness. Frost’s examples also extend out to the frontier (where the
“Chinee” received much the same treatment accorded
to blacks east of the Mississippi), and to the question
of women’s rights in California (though the argument
is rather thinner in this chapter than elsewhere). Overall, her book makes a valuable contribution to a number
of critical conversations. By showing how whites used
the strategy and lexicon of the freak show to shore up
their own identity against imaginary racialized creations, Frost provides a revealing perspective on the
needs of the dominant group at a time when the ground
below it was shaking.
LEONARD CASSUTO
Fordham University
MARK R. WILSON. The Business of War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865. (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology.) Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 306. $45.00.
This is essentially an institutional study of the Union
Quartermaster Department in the American Civil War,
and its central thesis is that “modern American business
and government were shaped directly and indirectly by
a military model of administration that had been on display in 1861–1865” (p. 4). While Mark R. Wilson convincingly argues that northern leaders such as Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs and his regional
quartermasters skillfully waged war by exploiting
Union advantages in technology and production to devise a vast bureaucracy that employed over one hundred
thousand civilian workers, he is less convincing in showing that the lessons of this military economy were taken
as a model by later Populist and Progressive reformers
and Gilded Age business leaders. Certainly the North’s
military bureaucracy was prodigious; it made or procured one billion rounds of ammunition, one million
horses and mules, six million woolen blankets, and ten
million pairs of trousers, but such an outpouring was
accompanied by an exhaustive internal debate between
those who advocated a mixed economy based on government manufacturing at depots, or “quartermaster
entrepreneurialism,” and those who supported “the political power of the producerist vision of military economy,” a free market supply system supported by laissezfaire Republicans (p. 173). Based principally on state
and national archives and on Harvard’s business collections, this work makes an excellent contribution to
the general understanding of Union military institutions and supplements standard studies by Fred A.
Shannon and Russell F. Weigley.
Established in 1818 and administered for forty-two
years by Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup, the Union
Quartermaster Department was staffed by men trained
at West Point and seasoned at isolated outposts across
the western frontier. Following the bombardment of

Fort Sumter, the Union encountered an entirely different set of logistical problems from those of the Mormon War or the war with Mexico. The first challenge to
the federal military bureaucracy was the northern
states, which quickly sallied into the field of production,
making contracts with local producers, sending agents
abroad, and establishing state-run factories with men,
women, children, and prisoners as workers. In efforts
rapidly to equip state troops, state quartermasters
rushed into production with little method, consistency,
or quality control. States competed with federal depots
for contracts with large firms like Brooks Brothers.
Convinced that states were guilty of favoritism, nepotism, and overpricing of shoddy merchandise, in the fall
of 1861 Meigs ordered all state production to cease. In
remarkable contrast to the Confederate experience,
Meigs succeeded. With the field cleared, Meigs established regional depots, and as needed, dozens of subdepots. Three depot quartermasters, originally commissioned in 1838, dominated Union purchasing:
Thomas Swords (Louisville and Cincinnati), George H.
Crosman (Schuylkill Arsenal, Philadelphia), and David
H. Vinton (New York) collectively expended $267 million or almost one-third of the department’s Civil War
budget. Quartermasters, believing that the depots produced goods of superior quality at lower prices, took a
broad view of their responsibilities and authority. An
estimated twenty-five percent of domestic war production came from the depots themselves. Quartermasters,
generally employing relatives of soldiers, packed pork,
made bread and furniture, built ships, and manufactured military equipage. In general, their civilian employees and some national Democratic leaders favored
this method. Ad hoc labor organizations, desperate for
well-paying jobs and suspicious of corruption and collusion at the higher levels of government, also were
champions of depot manufacturing and the mixed economy.
However, most military supplies in the war were secured from private businesses. Recovering from the
Panic of 1857 and suffering from the loss of their southern trade, northern businesses greatly needed the patronage of the War Department. The prevailing freemarket ideology of the Republicans and cash flow
problems at the government depots forced quartermasters to turn to the private economy. Quartermasters had
a limited allotment of cash or greenbacks, their vouchers or individual credit had a limited appeal, certificates
of indebtedness or federal notes were heavily discounted by brokers, and federal bonds were very longterm obligations. Only large businesses could accept
the certificates, the most common form of payment, and
they raised their bids accordingly to account for anticipated losses. Contrary to Jacksonian economic thinking, contracting was thrust into the hands of a small
number of major manufacturers and jobbers, some of
whom made substantial profits. Jay Cooke was a large
buyer of vouchers and certificates at a ten percent discount. A solitary firm or a small cluster of companies
were major contractors for Union horseshoes, rubber
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Canada and the United States
blankets, wagons, powder, heavy ordnance, fire arms,
and clothing. One-fifth of all military clothing came
from two jobbers. The resulting scandals strengthened
the public outcry for more depot manufacturing.
The mixed results of these Quartermaster Department experiments should generate caution regarding
their long-term influence on the American narrative.
Militating against the general adoption of an ethic of
public entrepreneurialism was the rise of substantial
business interests that generally saw government as an
antagonist, and the creation of a competing Confederate military tradition in which statist control of the
economy reached unprecedented, and uncomfortable,
levels.
HAROLD S. WILSON
Old Dominion University
JANE E. SIMONSEN. Making Home Work: Domesticity and
Native American Assimilation in the West, 1860–1919.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006.
Pp. xii, 266. Cloth $59.95, paper $22.50.
In 1999, President Bill Clinton made a highly publicized
stop at the home of Geraldine Blue Bird on the Pine
Ridge Indian reservation. He discovered that Ms. Blue
Bird was caring for twenty-eight adults and children in
a four-room house with no plumbing. The visit triggered an outpouring of generosity (which included a
new mobile home) and provided evidence that the “deliberate, arduous, and often self-conscious production
of domesticity”—the subject of Jane E. Simonsen’s
book—is an enduring feature of relations between Native Americans and their dispossessors.
The book contains six chapters that examine the
cross-cultural “contact zone” created when domesticity—described here as “an imperial construct used by
the white middle class to uphold its power in a diversifying and expansionist nation” (p. 3)—was imagined,
imposed and resisted in Indian communities. Rather
than track a single organization or institution, Simonsen traces the meaning of “domesticity” in Indian-white
relations between the time in the Civil War era when
writers and reformers imagined domestic reform as the
key to integrating indigenous peoples into the nation
and the second decade of the twentieth century, when
a combination of white indifference, Native resistance,
and social transformation had hardened racial and cultural hierarchies and Indian leaders like the artist Angel DeCora had emerged to complain that whites, “softened and perverted thro’ artificial living,” could not
appreciate the cultural achievements of indigenous
peoples (p. 212).
Simonsen’s narrative begins with Caroline Soule, an
easterner who relocated to Iowa in 1854 where she composed a sentimental novel, The Pet of the Settlement
(1860). Soule’s tale describes a Winnebago prophet
who converts to Christianity, marries an Indian girl, and
inherits property from a white woman, raising them
“into the middle class culture of security, access to
property, and familial inheritance.” Simonsen’s point is
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that Soule’s vision was part of mid-century “cultural
work” that linked child rearing to nation building and
promoted women’s domestic labor as an essential element in the development of the frontier. From Soule,
Simonsen moves on to debates within white society over
the value of domestic labor (in which Indians provide
a useful illustration of the value of white women’s labors and the consequences of societies that ignore domestic “civilization”), and to the history of the domestic
agenda of the Women’s National Indian Association.
The latter group—which preceded the Indian Rights
Association—originated the use of model cottages as
“object lessons” in the assimilation project. Together,
these chapters trace how “white, middle-class women
exported domesticity to the West” (p. 14).
In the final three chapters of her book Simonsen
shifts the focus from the white imagination to the realities of tribal life by examining three instances of attempted domestic reform: Alice Fletcher’s allotment of
the Nez Perces, the career of the Arikara social worker
Anna Dawson Wilde, and the art and commentary of
DeCora, a Winnebago woman who taught at Carlisle in
the decade prior to World War I. Here the story becomes more complicated as Indian people resist the domestic institutions being forced upon them (the background to Simonsen’s Nez Perce chapter) and even
begin to talk back. As part of Dawson Wilde’s story,
Simonsen presents a critique of this highly celebrated
“model Indian” (one of the first children brought to the
Hampton manual labor school in 1878) penned by Ella
Ripley, a Mandan who lived at the Fort Berthold reservation while Dawson Wilde was field matron there.
Ripley cut to the heart of the matter, attacking Dawson
Wilde for relying on “expertise” rather than community
and kin relationships in her social work. Ripley’s commentary not only “exposed Dawson Wilde’s professionalized, systematized version of domesticity” (p. 176),
but it revealed the extent to which domestic reform ignored issues of power, colonialism, and the denigration
of tribal traditions.
DeCora provides a fitting subject for Simonsen’s
closing chapter. Frequently ignored by historians or
marginalized as simply an “Indian illustrator,” DeCora
is revealed here as an articulate commentator on the
cultural politics surrounding her work as an art instructor at Carlisle. The image of DeCora stocking her classroom with ethnographic books from the Smithsonian
while urging her uniformed and incarcerated Native
students to “recall . . . the days of the old life” in order
to produce “genuine, legitimate Indian work” (p. 209)
contrasts sharply with Soule’s fictional Winnebago minister. The steady theme that unites the book, however—
that domesticity was a “contact zone” and battleground
between colonizers and colonized—links these images
and illuminates this period and topic in a new and exciting manner. This book does not add new data to an
old story; it tells a new story in a new way.
FREDERICK E. HOXIE
University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign
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